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Pyongyang Calls "Trial" Big Burlesque Crowded with Doubts and Riddles

Pyongyang Dec. 13 called the Nov. 22-Dec. 9 "trial" of the Rangoon bomb blast "a big burlesque crowded with doubts and riddles, shrouded in a fog and inconsistent."

A memorandum published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on Dec. 12 in Pyongyang said:

"The Burmese authorities, to make a long story short, fabricated in accordance with the prearranged script the prepostrous "results of investigation' claiming that the Rangoon explosion was 'a work of north Korea' through their 'political settlement' with the United States, Japan and the south Korean puppets and staged the fraudulent 'trial' farce to 'justify' them."

The memorandum, noting there was no ground whatever to support the allegation of the Burmese side that the "suspects" are "operatives" sent by the DPRK, raised various questions:

1) What degree of impartiality and authenticity the "indirectment" and "protocol of statements" published by the Burmese authorities could have;

2) On what ground the Burmese authorities concluded that the "suspects" were "terrorists sent by the DPRK";

3) Why are the "indictment," the "protocol of statements" of the "suspects" and the "testimonies" to the "witnesses" published by the Burmese authorities inconsistent and full of contradictions;

4) Why did Burmese authorities, though there were ample opportunities or identifying the "criminals" impartially, gave them up of their own accord;

5) Burmese declaration that the national mausoleum, the spot of explosion, had been left unguarded till the eve of the function is a lie.

In the second part of the memorandum, Pyongyang said that the mastermind of the Rangoon bomb incident is Chon Doo Hwan himself.

The memorandum analysed the motive of the incident as follows:

The DPRK Foreign Ministry already declared in its statement dated November 5:

It is not without reason that the traitor Chon Du Hwan faked up this burlesque.

Now the anti-U.S. struggle for independence and anti-fascist struggle for democracy of the patriotic people and students is daily gaining momentum in south Korea and the traitor Chon Du Hwan, a filthy dual stooge of the United States and Japan, is being driven into a serious fix within and without.

To extricate himself out of the blind alley, it was necessary for the traitor Chon Du Hwan to produce a shocking drama.

No sooner had the bomb exploded than the traitor Chon Du Hwan, kicking up a frenzied anti-communist, anti-DPRK racket groundlessly, issued an "emergency alert order" throughout south Korea and placed it on a full combat alert, intensified fascist suppression of the south Korean people as never before and pushed the situation on the Korean Peninsula to the brink of war.

The traitor Chon Du Hwan stage-managed the Rangoon explosion also to present a high-priced "present" to Reagan in his south Korean tour.

make a high-priced "present" to Reagan on the threshold of their master's south Korean tour.

This notwithstanding, the Costa Rican authorities, casting off the mask of the "neutral policy", joined the U.S. imperialists and south Korean puppets in the anti-DPRK campaign, thereby fully laying bare their true colour as a faithful servant of the imperialists.

This is an intolerable challenge impairing the international prestige of our country.

The Costa Rican authorities had deliberately worsened the relations between the two countries by repeatedly perpetrating unfriendly acts against our country at the zealous instigation of the U.S. imperialists and the south Korean puppet clique.

The Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Korean people have made consistent efforts to develop friendly relations between the two countries on the principles of complete equality, *chajusong* (independence), mutual respect and non-interference in other's internal affairs.

But the Costa Rican authorities let loose their secret police and intelligence agents to watch and control our personnel who went to San Jose in August 1974 to open our embassy, thus obstructing their activities, and demanded our personnel leave Costa Rica.

The Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Korean people sternly denounce the unjustifiable act committed again by the Costa Rican authorities against us this time as a grave criminal act ignoring international law and international usage and infringing upon the sovereignty of our country.

The Costa Rican authorities will be held wholly responsible for all the consequences arising from their unilateral severance of diplomatic relations with our Republic.

Costa Rican Gov. Denounced

PYONGYANG, December 9 (KCNA) – The spokesman of the Foreign Ministry of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea made public a statement on December 8 in connection with the unilateral announcement of the Government of Costa Rica that it was severing diplomatic relations with the DPRK.

Follows the full text of the statement:

The Costa Rican Government on December 6 unilaterally announced that it was breaking off diplomatic relations with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

The pretext brought forward by the Costa Rican authorities in severing diplomatic relations with our country is that we are to blame for the bomb blast in Rangoon.

As for this explosion, it was an offspring of a dastardly plot hatched by the south Korean rulers to divert elsewhere the attention of the people from their worsening political and economic crisis and

Chon Du Hwan Unpopular Figure With No Legitimacy: Washington Post

The Washington Post on Dec. 1 said that four years after Gen. Chon Du Hwan launched his drive to power, "he remains an unpopular figure without a broad-based political following".

As reasons for unpopularity of the career military officer, the Post cited the continuing suppression of dissent and a series of financial scandals that have touched his personal family and officials.

"Some also raise the basic question of legitimacy of a leader who took power by military might and who has banned from politics at one time or another virtually every significant figure in the country's ever-weak political opposition," said the Post.

Here are excerpts from the Dec. 1 article written by William Chapman:

SEOUL—Four years after "President" Chun Doo Hwan launched his drive to power, he remains an unpopular figure without a broad-based political following and many view with skepticism his pledge to start South Korea on the road to political democracy by stepping down voluntarily in five years.

..... interviews with many Koreans and foreign observers in recent months suggest that his personal support is shallow. They cite as reasons the continuing suppression of dissent, a series of financial scandals that have touched his personal family and officials in his government and Chun's own stiff and often autocratic behavior.

Some also raise the basic question of legitimacy of a leader who took power by military might and who has banned from politics at one time or another virtually every significant figure in the country's ever-weak political opposition.

Chun, a career military officer, came to power four years ago by leading a coup within the military establishment that ousted several top generals about two months after Park had been assassinated.

He subsequently elbowed aside a weak interim civilian government, jailed many dissenters, crushed a citizens' rebellion in the city of Kwangju and effectively took command of the country in the summer of 1980. Chun was formally installed as president in January 1981.

> *One foreign diplomat summed it up more succinctly: "Chun is out of the military, and he has never had legitimacy. He has not won popularity. He has not listened to people. He has no real followers. He is not a political leader.*

Several months ago a high government official who is now dead confided that the manner in which Chun took power is his heaviest liability.

One foreign diplomat summed it up more succinctly. "Chun is out of the military, and he has never had legitimacy. He has not won popularity. He has not listened to people. He has no real followers. He is not a political leader."

Chun has sought to establish his political legitimacy by promising to step aside when his seven-year term expires in 1988 and permit his successor to be elected under the constitution. That would be, he has said, the first peaceful transition of leadership in South Korean history. His promise drew praise from President Reagan on Nov. 12 during a state visit.

But the promise is questioned openly by many because the election law prescribes a complex, indirect election by a 5,278-member council from which all politicians are excluded. It would be composed of elected private citizens.

Opposition politicians claim the council would be 90 percent composed of pro-Chun people because critics would be weeded out of the process through threats and intimidation as they were under president Park's government.

The weak opposition party in the "National Assembly" has made a direct presidential election its major demand, but it is routinely rebuffed. Prime Minister Chin Lee Chong recenily testified in the assembly that the present system prevents division in public opinion and reduces election expenses.

More than 300 politicians remain under an official ban that prevents them from taking part in politics. Their ostracism is a legacy of Chun's taking power and promising to rid the country of favor-seeking politicians. The result has been a tame and disorganized new opposition party that poses no threat to Chun's domination.

Kim Young Sam, a former opposition leader who is among more than 300 people banned from politics, called it a system "fabricated" by the government to perpetuate the rule of Mr. Chun or an ally. Recalling Mr. Park's practice, he said the government would know which candidates for the council supported the ruling circles and would eliminate most of the opponents by forcing them to take trips during the election or by means of intimidation and blackmail.

When he and fellow military officers seized control, they also had promised an end to economic favoritism that had enriched a few businessmen and cronies of the late president Park. Weeding out corruption in government and business was their promise, intended to appeal to millions of South Koreans who felt left out of the economic miracle of the 1970s.

The pledge has been severely tarnished by repeated revelations of wrongdoing in the financial sector. There have been three major money-lending scandals in the past two years. One of them implicated a relative of Chun's wife and another has brought accusations of malfeasance by a member of his Cabinet.

Some critics believe the financial scandals have done more to discredit Chun among the public than the continuing suppression of political dissent.

The appearance of official wrongdoing adds to the anger of South Korea's already politicized students, who have staged sizable demonstrations this fall, said the Rev. Kim So Young, head of the Korean National Council of Churches.

"The demonstrations are increasing because of domestic complaints," he said in a recent interview.

"There are these financial scandals despite the government's promise of clean government. People think the government is behind the scandals and the suspicion is very pervasive. Many people feel left out of this age of affluence."

(第三種郵便物認可)

Memorandum of DPRK Foreign Ministry On "Trial" of Rangoon Explosion Case

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on December 12 published a memorandum exposing the shady background of the unilateral and unfair "trial" of the "suspects" of the Rangoon explosion case by the Burmese authorities.
Follows its full text:

The Burmese authorities staged from November 22 to December 9 a "trial" of the "suspects" of the case of Rangoon explosion which occurred on October 9.

The "trial" was held at the officers hall of the three services of the army on the outskirts of Rangoon under a strict guard, surrounded doubly and trebly by a large force of armed troops, Burmese fighter planes circling overhead.

At the "trial," according to a report, the Burmese police authorities, to begin with, read an "indictment" against the "suspects" and their "statements", which was followed by "questioning" of "witnesses" of the prosecution side.

Diplomats of some countries in Rangoon and home and foreign correspondents were reportedly present at the "court."

The Burmese authorities tried to give a semblance of legality to the "trial". But, it was clear from the beginning that it was a unilateral and unfair one.

The script of the trial had been prepared beforehand and the questions and answers were based on prearranged texts.

The whole course of the "trial", either by law or by fact, could never prove that the "suspects" were "operatives" sent by our Republic, as desired by the Burmese authorities.

The "trial" was a big burlesque crowded with doubts and riddles, shrouded in fog and inconsistent.

Let us now dig up the shady background of the dubious "trial" of the case of Rangoon explosion on the basis of the objective facts available.

1. "Trial" Crowded with Doubts and Contradictions

The "trial" of the Rangoon explosion case staged by the Burmese authorities left behind a host of doubts from the first step.

The first point in question is what degree of impartiality and authenticity the "indictment" and "protocol of statements" published by the Burmese authorities could have.

The Burmese authorities conducted jointly with the south Korean puppets the investigation to probe into the truth of the Rangoon explosion.

We may quote the following reports in this connection:

"No sooner had the incident broke out on October 9 than the authorities hurriedly dispatched to Burma a special investigation group headed by the Sports Minister". (south Korean "Radio No. 1," October 9, 1983).

"Arriving in Burma, the Sports Minister demanded of the Burmese Government through her Foreign Minister on October 10 a joint investigation by the investigation groups of the two countries to probe into the truth of the assassination explosion in Burma". (south Korean "Radio Munhwa," October 11, 1983).

"The investigation group had a consultation with chiefs of competent organs of the Burmese side including the intelligence department chief of the Burmese army in the office of the Aung San national mausoleum and reached an agreement on the establishment of a joint investigation headquarters of the two countries for a quick and correct investigation" and "there the Burmese side promised active cooperation in the investigation activities." (south Korean "Radio Munhwa," October 11, 1983).

Upon returning from Burma on October 13, the puppet Sports Minister said at a press conference held at Kimpo airport that "in investigating the bomb blast for assassination in Burma the Burmese Government is active in close cooperation with our technical group for a probe into its truth" and declared that "in clarifying the incident it conducts wide-ranging close cooperation not only in investigation but also in many other aspects." (south Korean "Radio Munhwa," October 14, 1983).

The United States, too, under the cloak of "technical support to investigation in Rangoon" sent to the spot a "special team in charge of it" consisting of U.S. state department officials with agents of U.S. CIA as its nucleus. (south Korean "Radio No. 1," October 10, 1983).

The world knows that no sooner had the bomb blasted in Rangoon than the south Korean puppets advertised it as a "work of north Korea" without any ground and kicked up a frenzied row in an attempt to shift the responsibility for it on to us, and their American master zealously encouraged them.

Since the Burmese authorities started a "joint investigation" with them, it was as clear as noonday what results would be faked up.

The second point in question is on what ground the Burmese authorities concluded that the "suspects" were "terrorists sent by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea."

It has been reported that the "suspects" were not in a condition to be interrogated and tried in a normal state.

According to Japanese "Asahi Shimbun", both of the "suspects seemed to have difficulty in moving only a few days before the 'trial'. One could scarcely make voice and the other lay with his intestines exposed, awaiting medical treatment. A worsening symptom from the second infection was noticed." (Japanese "Asahi Shimbun", November 9, 1983).

When the "suspects" were brought to the "court," one was "minus his left hand" and the other "looked formidable, his right hand missing and eyes blinded, and he had difficulty in walking." (south Korean "Radio No. 1", November 23, 1983).

Those who witnessed the "trials" said in unison that it was dubious if the "suspects" would clearly understand what was going on about them.

It is strange why the Burmese authorities brought the "suspects" so hurriedly to the court and staged the "trial" when they were in such a deplorable state. This is quite out of common sense.

It was disclosed in the course of the "trial" that one of the two "suspects" presented by the Burmese authorities had not made any "confession" to the last.

A foreign news agency reported as regards this:

"The leader of the commando team on trial for a terrorist bombing attack has made no confession after more than one month and a half in the custody of the Burmese authorities, said the court sources on November 28. (AP, Rangoon November 28, 1983).

According to a report, this "suspect" "refused to admit his being guilty" even at the last "hearing" (Japanese radio NHK, December 7, 1983).

It is also very questionable how the words of the "suspect" who allegedly "confessed" that he came "from north Korea" were cooked up.

This "suspect" said he came "from Seoul, south Korea," on October 22, when he was interrogated in his hospital bed by the south Korean puppet special envoy to Burma in the presence of the ambassadors of third countries and officials concerned of the Burmese Government.

Upset by this, the south Korean puppets declared that "the criminals talk nonsense" in "mental derangement" and "what he said is incredible." (south Korean "Radio No. 1," October 25, 1983).

They said the "suspect" "had been repeating an unauthentic statement, talking jargon in the course of investigation till October 30" (south Korean "Radio No. 1" October 30, 1983).

It was officially reported that on November 3, a few days after that, the "suspect" who had been "in mental derangement," "confessed" that he was an "operative" sent by our Republic.

We are, of course, in the dark as to what method of fabrication was applied to this "suspect" in the course of investigation, the man who had been reportedly "in mental derangement" with heavy wounds.

But, what is surprising and strange above all here is that, on the day following his "confession," the Burmese authorities held an "emergency cabinet meeting," as if they had been waiting for it, and hastily took a step of severing diplomatic relations with our Republic and ordering our embassy to leave Burma, without taking off time to make a scientific confirmation of the truth of his confession.

Why did the Burmese authorities not recognize the repeated and stubborn declaration of the "suspect" that he "came from Seoul, south Korea," but continued the coercive interrogation and why did they so hastily take the extreme step against our Republic as soon as they wrested from him the words he "came from north Korea"?

Truth to tell, it is a common view in any country that the "confession" of a "suspect" alone without material evidence cannot be a ground for declaring anyone guilty.

The whole course of the "trial" vividly showed that there was no ground whatever to support the allegation of the Burmese side that the "suspects" are "operatives" sent by our Republic.

Not without reason, therefore, even the lawyers engaged by the Burmese side at the "court" declared that "the case must be dismissed because it has been faked up entirely on the basis of the confession of a 'suspect' and "it is devoid of material evidence."

The third point in question is why are the "indictment," the "protocol of statements" of the "suspects" and the "testimonies" of the "witnesses" published by the Burmese authorities inconsistent and full of contradictions.

According to the so-called "protocol of statements" made public by the Burmese authorities on the second day of the "trial", the "suspects" "went aboard a north Korean boat in Ongjin on the west coast of north Korea on September 9 and arrived in Rangoon on September 22 or 23. (AP, Rangoon November 23, 1983).

But, on the third day of the "trial" on November 24, "the director of the Burma state harbour company who testified in defence of the Burmese authorities' assertion said that the three suspects infiltrated into Rangoon port in the guise of crewmen of the ship 'Tonggon' which left Nampo port" and the ship 'Tonggon' entered the Soledeok harbour No. 6 of Rangoon port at 4 on the afternoon of September 17 and began unloading on September 18." (south Korean "Radio No. 1", November 24, 1983).

The "protocol of statements" says that the "suspects" left Ongjin on board an unidentified "north Korean boat" and " arrived in Rangoon on September 22 or 23," whereas the "testimony" of the Burmese side's "witness" claims that the ship in question is "Tonggon" which left Nampo port and entered Rangoon port on "September 17". Why?

This difference tells that the far-fetched fabrication cannot but be inconsistent from the beginning.

Next, the "protocol of statements" says that "the suspects', after their arrival in Rangoon port were met by an official of the north Korean embassy in Burma and had hid themselves in the house of a counsellor of the embassy."

Giving a more detailed account of this question, a police officer of Rangoon harbour who appeared as a "witness" of the Burmese side said that "the suspects' in the guise of crewmen of the 'Tonggon' anchored at Rangoon port got landing permit from the Burmese Government and landed in Rangoon port with the confirmation of the harbour police. (south Korean "Radio No. 1," November 24, 1983).

It follows from the words of the Burmese side that the "suspects" did not illegally infiltrate into Rangoon, but landed big question.

How could the seamen who landed with a temporary permit stay in Rangoon, not returning until the ship left?

And, if the crewmen who had made a temporary landing were not back, how could the ship "Tonggon" leave Rangoon port?

According to the "testimony" of the director of the Burma state harbour company, "the master of the 'Tonggon' applied for the permit for departure after unloading was finished on September 21 and stayed three more days and got the permit on September 24 and left on schedule. (south Korean "Radio No. 1," November 24, 1983).

That the Burmese authorities permitted the "Tonggon" to leave means that the ship had all legal conditions for departure. Had the seamen who had made a temporary landing did not return, why did the Burmese authorities issue the permit for departure to the ship?

Was it out of "kindness"? No!

A Japanese magazine wrote that "Burma pursues a stringent policy of seclusion and restricts the entry of foreign ships into Rangoon port and is so strict as to hardly allow temporary landing of seamen, to say nothing of transit." (Japanese magazine "Mr. Dandy").

We are told that the "Tonggon" left Rangoon port legally without any hindrance under such strict watch of the Burmese authorities. This means that it is a groundless lie to claim that it left Rangoon port, leaving in Rangoon the seamen who had made a temporary landing.

Even if we presume that it was true, the assertion of the Burmese authorities does not hold water.

How could those men who made a temporary landing after legal registration by the Burmese authorities remain two weeks there, not returning to the ship, and commit such terrible bomb blast in broad daylight?

This means that the crime was committed with the clue disclosed beforehand. No one but fool would conceive such a thing even in fantasy.

The fourth point in question is that the Burmese authorities, though there were ample opportunities of identifying the "criminals" impartially, gave them up of their own accord.

According to the "protocol of statements," the "suspects" who had intruded into Rangoon "were in hiding at the house of a councillor of the north Korean embassy in Tangu street, Rangoon, till October 6."

But this either is utterly impossible.

The Japanese "Tokyo Shimbun" reported that "from about two months before Chon Du Hwan came, north Koreans were closely shadowed by Burmese secret police" and, accordingly, "it was impossible for the north Korean embassy to plot such incident". (Japanese "Tokyo Shimbun," October 5, 1983).

The south Korean puppets themselves confessed: "The north Korean embassy does not seem to have been involved in this incident. Because the Burmese Government sharply watched the moves of its staffers from one month before Chon Du Hwan's Burma visit and so the operatives could not act freely." (south Korean "Radio No. 1," October 12, 1983).

If it were true that the "suspects" were in hiding at the house of a councillor of our embassy, as the Burmese authorities claimed, they had an ample opportunity of authorities claimed, they had an ample opportunity of squarely and lawfully confirming this fact vis-a-vis our embassy.

(Continued on page 3)

Memorandum of DPRK Foreign Ministry

(Continued from page 2)

But the Burmese authorities began with expelling our embassy, without the slightest intention to do that.

Since the Burmese authorities took issue with us, it should have given us an opportunity of clarifying our stand, in view of international law and international usage.

According to a report, the Burmese judicial authorities on November 25, prior to the fourth trial, took the "suspect" who had "confessed" to the "House of the Councillor of the north Korean embassy, the local spot of operation, for a spot inspection" and the "suspect" "made a detailed statement about the food they had been served in the house". (south Korean "Radio No. 1," November 28, 1983).

Of course, we do not know if the Burmese authorities really took the "suspect" to the councillor's for "a spot inspection". But, even if that were true, we wonder why they had not made that "inspection" when our embassy officials were on the spot, but raised a row of "inspection" and "confirmation" in the empty house after they were expelled.

Only if they had taken the "suspect" there when our embassy staffers were assembled and let him point at the "councillor" in question, everything would have been made clear then and there.

It is a very elementary procedure in the investigation into a criminal case to arrange such tripartite meeting.

But the Burmese authorities expelled our diplomats first of all without so much as such elementary procedure. This arouses our deep doubt as to their real intention.

Perhaps, they did not venture this, because they feared that if they made the three meet, the "suspect" would be unable to recognize the "councillor" in question and then it would seriously damage their fabrication of the incident.

The fifth point in question is their declaration that the national mausoleum, the spot of explosion, had been left unguarded till eve of the function.

According to the "protocol of statements", the "suspects" "climbed the roof of the Aung San mausoleum and planted the bomb on its ceiling at ten on the night of October 7". And, in the meantime, the mausoleum was left unguarded and the only guardsman was asleep in the sentry box". (Japanese "Yomiuri Shimbun" November 24, 1983).

"Asahi Shimbun" reported that "Rangoon which had been always on a strict alert was put under an uncommon guard" on the threshold of Chon Du Hwan's trip. (Japanese "Asahi Shimbun" October 10, 1983).

According to another Japanese magazine, nearly 200 south Korean puppet guardsmen had been posted, in fact, at the Burmese national mausoleum from about 10 days before the function. (Japanese magazine "Tsukuru").

The claim that the national mausoleum "was in a defenceless state without any guard" on the eve of the function is a lie that can convince no one.

If it were "in a defenceless state", what were the hundreds of south Korean puppet guardsmen doing in Rangoon?

If it were true that the Burmese authorities themselves left the place where the function was to be held "in a defenceless state," not organizing any guard till the eve of the function, Burma would be a country which is ignorant of the elementary national security step and international usage of etiquette.

All facts show that the national mausoleum where Chon Du Hwan was to go was strictly guarded air-tight.

Had the "suspects" been dispatched by our Republic as the Burmese authorities allege, how could they break into the national mausoleum and install a bomb there, those strangers who do not know Burma's geography and her language.

The DPA News Agency of West Germany said in a report from Rangoon that "it was impossible nor north Koreans to plant a bomb there, since it was guarded day and night." (DPA, West Germany, October 10, 1983).

The English-language paper of Thailand "The National Review" said that "since entry into Burma is controlled very strictly, it is extremely difficult for a foreign group to infiltrate into the country and carry out such operation". (AP, Bangkok October 11, 1983).

It goes without saying that no one can approach there without secret communication with the guardsmen of the Chon Du Hwan puppet clique who had been posted there beforehand or with Burmese guard authorities.

A Japanese magazine wrote:

"In Burma foreigners who walk along the road are sure to be shadowed by intelligence agents and if they take a step into a back lane, they are suspected. It is difficult even to go shopping because of information by citizens. If one slipped off under such circumstances and succeeded in carrying the bomb, explosive devices and so on to the Aung San mausoleum, he must have many helpers close to the Burmese Government". (Japanese magazine "Mr. Dandy").

What is meaningful in this connection is the following report of the Japanese Jiji Press November 9:

"The criminals visited the house of a custodian of the Aung San mausoleum under cover of kindness and told him that they were guardsmen of Chon Du Hwan. Then they gave him 10,000 kyat in Burmese currency corresponding to one million *won* and currency corresponding to one million *won* and got from him a ladder and thus succeeded in laying a bomb on the roof of the mausoleum." (Japanese Jiji Press, November 9, 1983).

The south Korean paper "Chosen Ilbo" November 10 carried this report of the Japanese Jiji Press.

This bespeaks that the planting of a bomb in the Rangoon national mausoleum could be done only by the Chon Du Hwan clique themselves.

The "protocol of statements" published by the Burmese authorities and the "testimonies" of the Burmese "witnesses" to confirm it give rise to many doubts.

In a nutshell, the biggest point in question is why the Burmese authorities failed to produce at the "trial" a single legal and material evidence enough to prove the basic question that the "suspects" were "operatives" sent by our Republic.

The "material evidences" produced by the Burmese authorities are "unexploded incendiary" left on the spot, "Japan-made electric torch", "Belgium-made browing" and "man-killing fountainpen" which were allegedly carried by the "suspects" when they were arrested.

How could such things which are found in any part of the world "prove" that the "suspects" were sent by our Republic?

Even the U.S. paper "The New York Times" wrote that it has not been made clear why these articles are certainly connected with north Korea". (the U.S. paper "The New York Times," October 14, 1983).

The Japanese paper "Tokyo Times" in an article titled "Rangoon Bomb Blast. Three Unaccountable Enigmas" said:

"This incident leaves a number of riddles such as how did the criminals sneak into the spot of extreme under the martial law state, beside the simple question: Did north Korea really commit such crime which would make the whole world its enemy?

"How could the criminal infiltrate into the spot of crime and install a bomb under the martial law system enforced by the Burmese and south Korean sides?

"This is the biggest puzzle, because the south Korean guardsmen alone numbered 300 and a strict alert was ordered beforehand and the north Korean embassy was under the watch of Burma from two months before the incident."

According to this paper, a Japanese commentation said:

"I had been paying attention to the enforcement of the Rangoon explosion case. But its content was so poor that it does not hold water. Such materials give no answer to the questions." (Japanese "Tokyo Times" November 25, 1983).

The unbiased public opinion of the world is now casting in unison deep suspicion on the "trial" farce of the Burmese authorities and throwing contempt and disdain at the poorly staged burlesque.

But one thing was made clear through the "trial"–the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has nothing to do with the Rangoon explosion.

2. Who Is the Real Criminal?

Then, who is the real criminal in the Rangoon bomb blast? He is none other than the traitor Chon Du Hwan himself.

We can bring this to light by our logical inference and judgement of facts.

Shortly after the Rangoon bomb blast, foreign publications said that it might be a drama of Chon Du Hwan's own making.

Tanjug said that "it is considered in Tokyo that it was not accidental for Chon Du Hwan to have been 'fortunately late' in going to the scene of the tragic incident and the possibility of him, the dictator of south Korea, being involved in the bomb blast was claimed the lives of south Korean cabinet ministers is not excluded". (Tanjug News Agency of Yugoslavia, Tokyo, October 14, 1983).

The Japanese "Shakai Shimpo" in an article titled "terrorism and assassination caused by military regime" said:

"The reaction of Chon Du Hwan who personally linked the terrorist incident with north Korea is aimed at using the incident as a lever for preventing the vacillation in south Korea." (Japanese "Shakai Shimpo," October 14, 1983).

The question here is, first of all, how the traitor Chon Du Hwan could have survived the Rangoon bomb blast while his suite members were all killed.

In this regard Chon Du Hwan himself said when he incited anti-communist fever among representatives of government-controlled political parties including "Democratic Justice Party" on October 14:

"My original plan was to visit the Aung San mausoleum with my entourage strightly from Rangoon airport on October 8. But I instructed the date to be put off to the following day. This seems to be a decisive factor of evading the misfortune". (south Korean "Radio Seoul," October 14, 1983).

Then why did Chon Du Hwan change at will the date of his visit to the mausoleum he had agreed upon with the Burmese authorities he had agreed upon with the Burmese authorities and postpone it till the following day?

The bomb blasted on the morning of October 9. Had Chon Du Hwan gone to the mausoleum on October 8 as planned, not changing the date, all would have been safe. But he stubbornly changed the date and didn't go to the spot at the moment when the explosion broke out. What does this mean?

This tells that he brought death to his underlings and he himself escaped it.

"Radio Seoul" reported about the situation at that time:

"Before Chon Du Hwan arrived, official and unofficial suite members were lined up at the Aung San mausoleum, assembled individually.

"At 10:25, just before the bomb blast, our ambassador to Burma arrived on the scene in his car carrying the flag, guided by motorcycles, to join the suite members who had already been present there. About one minute later, the bugle for the repose of the deceased was sounded and the bomb blasted." (south Korean "Radio Seoul," October 10, 1983).

It was made clear later that the traitor Chon Du Hwan was reaching a spot 1.5 kilometres off after leaving in a car the guest house 4.8 kilometres from the spot of the guest house 4.8 kilometres from the spot of explosion. This was not because he had a good luck.

The point is why he sent his suite members there in advance in violation of diplomatic usage and left lately alone.

Herein lies the biggest riddle.

The "spokesman" of Chon Du Hwan had reportedly claimed that he was "delayed by traffic jam."

Even if he is a puppet president not worth a penny, he was invited by the Burmese authorities as a "stage guest". It is impossible, indeed, that he could not arrive in time at the function spot because he alone was caught in a traffic jumble in the city.

Does it mean that even a police car with a mission to control traffic was not attached to Chon Du Hwan himself, while the puppet ambassador to Burma who left just before him went with an escort car? It is foolish to explain his being late "traffic jam."

As to the cause of Chon Du Hwan's delay the Burmese Government corrected its announcements twice or thrice, saying that he was "late because he was met by the Burmese Foreign Minister late" and then stating that it followed "the customs of the south Korean side".

This shows that their words are in a mess of confusion.

Chon Du Hwan did not go to the scene of explosion because he knew that there would be a bomb blast.

The "bugle for the repose of the deceased" which has been expected to be sounded at the function after the arrival of Chon Du Hwan at the cemetery rang out before his arrival and the bomb blasted with the bugle call. This fact, too, clearly proves that the incident was a drama stage-managed by Chon Du Hwan.

According to a report of the south Korean paper "Chungang Ilbo", the "bugle for the repose of the deceased" was sounded before Chon Du Hwan's arrival because "a south Korean guardsman requested the Burmese side to blow it once."

Thus the "bugle" which had been to be sounded after the arrival of Chon Du Hwan was sounded in advance at the "request of the south Korean guardsman" and the bomb exploded at that moment and Chon Du Hwan alone survived it. Isn't it a homicidal drama staged on the order of the traitor Chon Du Hwan himself?

Foreign publications also pay attention to the following points:

"No explanation is given yet why the south Korean ambassador to Burma who was playing the role of the local guide arrived after the deputy Prime Minister and all other suite members, his superiors, were lined up. Didn't the south Korean ambassador first play the role of the "scapegoat" to prevent a possible bomb attack on Chon Du Hwan?" (Japanese magazine "Mr. Dandy").

This is a very correct judgement, we may say.

That Chon Du Hwan knew in advance of the explosion is well illustrated by the fact that the moment the explosion sounded he gave up going to the scene and drove back.

In this regard AP said that there was no trace of Chon Du Hwan going on to the scene after the bomb explosion. He immediately changed the course and went off." How could Chon Du Hwan know that the explosion sounded from the national mausoleum and turn round instantly?

Even if he heard a bomb exploded, it would have been normal for him to go to national mausoleum as arranged, since he didn't know what explosion it was.

But he turned round as soon as the explosion sounded, as if he had been waiting for that explosion, because he knew what it meant.

That the Rangoon bomb blast was a drama of the Chon Du Hwan "cabinet reshuffle" carried out on October 14 to call it to account for the incident.

In this "cabinet shake-up" Chon Du Hwan dismissed many vassals including the puppet prime minister. But he left the "director of the security planning board" and the "chief guard secretary of chongwadae," who should have been held more responsible for the incident than anyone else, at their posts, saying that "they were not to blame."

As noted in the above, according to the "protocol of statements" of the Burmese authorities, the "Aung San mausoleum was in a defenceless state" when the "suspects" planted a bomb there. Then, what does he mean by claiming that the "director of the security planning board" and the "chief guard secretary of chongwadae" were not to blame for this?

This suggests that the traitor Chon Du Hwan needed not to call them to task, as he had plotted the Rangoon explosion in conspiracy with them.

All the facts eloquently prove that the Rangoon explosion was a drama of dastardly and vicious murder plotted and committed by the traitor Chon Du Hwan himself.

It shows more clearly that the traitor Chon Du Hwan, the very arch-type massacrer of thousands of defenceless people in Kwangju, is a truculent murderer and human-butcher who made no scruples of killing his "Cabinet Ministers" in swamps for his insidious political purpose.

The Swedish paper "Gnistan" in an article titled "South Korea Kills 'cabinet ministers' by Explosion" said:

"It is said that hundreds of troops stood guard around the mausoleum. Even the date of visit was changed for security reasons.

"But how could Chon Du Hwan alone was delayed by traffic jam?

"It is becoming clear that the Rangoon incident was a drama of Chon Du Hwan's own making". ("Gnistan" of Sweden, November 10, 1983).

The Bangladesh paper "Naya Jug" in an article headlined "Smokescreen of Rangoon Bomb Blast" wrote that the "Rangoon explosion was a drama stage-managed by the south Korean dictator himself to divert elsewhere the word's attention." (Bangladesh "Naya Jug," October 23, 1983).

(Continued on page 7)

South Korea and World in 1983

By Paek Han Gi
Special to The People's Korea

For the past three years since the inauguration of the Reagan administration in Washington with the campaign promise to rebuild "strong America," numerous concerned people the world over have closely followed each move of the American government with visible misgivings and apprehensions.

Persistent fear has remained that the trigger-happy Reagan would embark upon a "dangerous adventure" in the second half of his present term.

This fear, as it turned out, has proved to be well-grounded and come true. Look at the past year, you will find everywhere manifest evidence as dramatized by a series of shocking incidents: the American invasion of Grenada, the Lebanese affair, the siting of intermediate-range nuclear weapons in Western European countries, including the Pershing II missiles and cruise missiles Tomahawk, the spy flight into Russian airspace of a south Korean jetliner and the ensuing anti-communist propaganda, the Aquino assassination incident in Manila and the Rangoon bombing masterminded by the south Koreans with U.S. support.

What disquiets us is an illusion gripping Reagan that his apparent policy failures at home and abroad are "successful," which he feels should be pursued vigorously.

This calls for the highest degree of attention to be paid to the course of developments on the Korean Peninsula and world events in 1984, the year of an American presidential election.

Highly Volatile Korean Situation

To the people of Korea, 1983 is one of the few years which cannot be forgotten.

While the Democratic People's Republic of Korea celebrated its 35th anniversary with much fanfare in September, the situation on the Korean Peninsula quickly deteriorated in the wake of the south Korean airliner's intrusion into Russian airspace on spy mission and the Chon Du Hwan-mastermined anti-communist bogey Rangoon bomb blast. A highly dangerous state of things prevailed on the peninsula where war acts might be resumed at any moment.

Such buildup of tensions is the first in the years since the 1968 Pueblo incident and the 1975 poplar tree incident.

As it turned out after all, the situation in and around Korea has been ominous since the outset of the year.

The first omen came in the January south Korean visit of Japanese premier Nakasone which was ended with a security-related aid package totall'ng $4 billion to thė dictatorial junta of Gen. Chon Du Hwan and paved the way for the eventual formation of a three-way military alliance comprising the United States, Japan and south Korea.

This was a logical outcome of the policy conduct of the Nakasone government which attaches top priority to the strengthened relations with the United States as the keystone of Japanese foreign policy and regards it as a first duty to commit itself to the Russian and Asian strategy and in particular Korean military strategy of the Reagan administration.

During his January visit to the United States, Nakasone said that his country and the U.S. were in the same boat. He went on to declare the readiness to convert his island country into an unsinkable flattop and close its four straits.

In the meantime, the Chon junta trapped in a crossfire of political and economic crises was boundlessly relieved by the "providential help" in the form of Nakasone's trip to Seoul and his offer of a huge sum of money.

Confrontation with the north and the generation of tensions on the Korean Peninsula are viewed by the Chon junta as essential to its bid to divert the daily growing public discontents, crack down on the dissident forces demanding anti-American independence, liberty and democracy, and maintain its hold on power. This political need of the south Korean client regime totally fits in with the Asian strategy of the Reagan administration and the Nakasone government. The American strategy envisions the need to retain south Korea as the foremost colonial military base and barrier to communism.

Limited Nuclear War Scenario: "Team Spirit" War Games

February saw an unprecedented sharpening of tensions on the Korean Peninsula to the point where resumption of hostilities is received as no wonder – an extremely explosive situation.

The Reagan administration launched in force on February 1 the American-south Korean joint military exercises codenamed "Team Spirit '83" with a large force of some 191,000 troops transported from the U.S. mainland, Guam, Okinawa and other areas of the Asian and Pacific rim.

The successive American administrations have regarded the Korean Peninsula as a frontline beachhead for the execution of the world strategy and a testing ground for the confrontation of strength. With this perception as the underlying premise, the "Team Spirit" series of joint war games have been annual features of the American policy conduct in Asia since 1976.

This year's joint war games bore a number of features different from the previous ones.

The first feature is the number of troops involved, far greater than that of the war games held last year.

Secondly, the war games obviously aimed at limited nuclear war on the Korean Peninsula against the DPRK. Targets of the assault operations, landing operations and river-crossing operations were military and civilian facilities in the north.

Presently about 1,000 nuclear warheads are sited in south Korea, whose use the American officials have publicly threatened against the DPRK in case of a contingency. One official went as far as to declare the readiness to "go to the heart of the opponent."

The then U.S. army chief of staff Gen. Meyer in his news conference on January 22 admitted the likelihood of use of nuclear weapons against the north.

In the third place, the timing of the "Team Spirit '83" is significant as it came just after the virtual formation of the U.S.-Japan-south Korea military alliance. The U.S.-south Korean joint war games are closely and directedly linked to those between the U.S. and Japan.

On February 1, the Supreme Command of the Korean People's Army responded to the growing threats to the DPRK by putting the whole of the country on a semi-war footing.

The Reagan administration alleges the threat from the north and clamors about the military balance on the Korean Peninsula. These allegations are threadbare and have little factual ground as it is illustrated by the fact that no single nuclear weapon is in place in the DPRK, while a large number of nuclear weapons are deployed in south Korea, targeted on the DPRK.

Photo shows Kim Yong Sam on a hunger strike in a room of Seoul National University Hospital (May 30). Former south Korean opposition leader Kim Yong Sam had been running the risk of death by going on a hunger strike for 23 days, demanding democracy for south Korea and against Reagan's trip to Seoul as a pledge of backup to the fascist repressive policy of the military "regime". On Aug. 13 he also joined Kim Dae Jung now in exile in the U.S. in publishing a statement opposing the U.S. role in south Korea and declaring their readiness to sacrifice everything they have for their country's democratization.

'Spring in Seoul' – Nightmare for Despot

As seen above, the situation on the Korean Peninsula has grown explosive since the beginning of the year, one of the very things most needed by the Chon Du Hwan junta.

The junta is haunted by the nighmarish spectre of "spring in Seoul."

As spring comes around with new sprouts and sunshine, it has a strong possibility of rebursts of student and popular protests demanding liberty and democracy. Within spring come renewed hopes of long-awaited surcease from the dark period of fascism.

The 1960 spring saw a popular uprising toppling the Syngman Rhee client government. Spring 20 years hence and in particular May was a period of nation-wide popular protests which climaxed in the Kwangju uprising, posing the worst threat to the junta of Gen. Chon.

Prevention of repetition of such nighmarish affair is concern number one for the junta. An all-purpose familiar anti-communist bogey is again being undisguisedly invoked in parallel with the generation of a war atmosphere in an attempt to keep under control the struggle of the youth and people from other walks of life representing a broader-based political spectrum.

Oppression self-evidently breeds resistance. Evidence is amply provided by the history of the Korean people. This year is no exception.

A number of coups brought Gen. Chon and company to power. His rise to power is blood-stained as it was lain through a lake of blood in the Kwangju Massacre. Once installed in the blue house with U.S. endorsement, the junta, wielding the stick and carrot, barely managed to cling to power for the past three years. The price paid is dear: oil has been poured on the flames of the anti-Chon and anti-American popular resistance movement, showing no sign of dying out.

In quite a dramatic move, former leader of the banned major opposition New Democratic Party Kim Yong Sam went on a hunger strike in Seoul releasing a statement "To Our People" rejecting the dictatorial junta and urging the establishment of democratic government. He also called for the immediate release of all political detainees and freedoms of political activity and the press.

Local civic leaders, among them Christian leaders, and the opposition forces gave positive support to the fast of Kim Yong Sam and took a variety of solidarity action, including the issue of "an emergency democratic manifesto." This led to the June 1 formation of the Citizens Council for Democracy.

A notable thing about the struggles launched by democrats and other democratic strata is that they are putting aside their differences in view to unite on the principle of opposing foreign forces and dictatorship. Kim Yong Sam and Kim Dae Jung, who viewed each other as rivals, issued a joint statement challenging the dictatorial junta. On September 27, former 24 national assemblymen jointly published a statement "For Democracy in Korea."

Students were far from silent. Their protest activities have been on the steady increase throughout the year. As of June 4, a total 46 protest actions were reported from 20 universities across south Korea.

Student protests are characterized as increasing anti-Americanism which drew major attention in the bombing attack on the Taegu U.S. cultural center on September 22.

The whole month of September witnessed anti-American demonstrations at 12 universities. During a November 1-11 period prior to the Seoul visit of Reagan, demonstrations were staged at 15 universities and in many other places throughout south Korea, including main streets of Seoul, undaunted by the heavy police security cordon.

A particularly significant aspect of the democratic protests mounted by the south Korean students and civic movement is its progressive move away from the partly real and partly strategic criticism of the north.

Even civic and opposition leaders in their previous statements did not fail to express some criticism of the north while denouncing the tyrannical policy of the junta, an area for exploitation by the latter in gagging dissenting views.

In the wake of the Rangoon bombing incident – engineered by the Chon junta to divert public attention and shock the people into silence – a number of "government"-sponsored anti-Pyongyang demonstrations and assemblies were organized. Conspicuously absent in those campaigns were college students and democratic civic leaders. No criticism of Pyongyang was made in any student statements. The Rangoon bombing case was totally ignored by the protesting students and opposition forces.

This year's anti-Americanism took on a different nature from the previous years' – a shift from passivity to positivity – and took a violent turn.

South Korea was previously called the only place without anti-Americanism in the world.

Over the past four years, however, a number of American cultural centers were set on fire and burnt down in a spectacular display of anti-Americanism. Anti-Americanism is a direct product of the U.S.-sanctioned Kwangju Massacre.

More than 2,000 people were massacred in Kwangju by special force units commanded by Gen. Chon with American approval.

Until then, many south Koreans were apt to look up to the Americans as "champions of democracy."

This sort of respect to the U.S. gave way to anti-Americanism as an eye-opener came in the attack on the same Korean people by south Korean troops under the U.S.-south Korea combined forces command.

Anti-Americanism was reinforced when Chon was invited to Washington by Reagan as his first guest after his inauguration as U.S. president. Chon was given a promise of continuing American support for his role as an American client.

Political and Economic Crisis Deteriorating

The grip of Chon Du Hwan on power is fast faltering in the face of the deteriorating political and economic crisis at a time when the four full years of Chon's rule are coming to an end without any way out from the crisis in sight. Regardless of the perception of the situation, the prospect for Chon is bleak.

A clear indication is in the fact that in the past two years alone four premiers were dismissed and 13 cabinent reshuffles undertaken, making it practically impossible for a smooth and effective running of administration.

Former associates who played a key role in the December 1979 coup – Gen. Ro Tae U and Gen. Kim Bok Tong – quitted. Many will likely follow suit.

A considerable army officers have been left disgruntled over the distribution of posts, giving rise to numerous stories of attempted coups against Chon Du Hwan.

Factional infightings are far from over within the inner circles of the junta. Such internal bickering may escalate into an open defiance of Chon.

To put bluntly, Gen. Chon has totally cut himself away from the former associates and has no real followers. He has failed to win public approval. His power base has been eroded to a great extent. In the eyes of a growing number of uniformed officers and technocrats allied with business community leaders, Gen. Chon is becoming more of a liability.

Topping the list of troubles facing Chon is an economic crisis.

A key index of the economic plight is the staggering foreign debt which has swollen to $42 billion from the figure of $37.3 billion at the end of last year. A main destabilizing factor is the growing share of short-term loans in the total sum of foreign debts. The share rose to 57 percent in 1982.

The exports which the junta of Gen. Chon has done everything to boost have remained stagnant, with trade deficits snowballing. The battle against inflation, the runaway prices and the unemployment issue is useless.

A contributing factor in the worsening social unrest which in turn aggravates the political and economic crisis is a host of financial scandals in which the family of Chon is clearly implicated.

The first in the series of scandals surfaced in April last year, as Chon's wife Li Sun Ja, his uncle Li Kyu Gwang and his sister-in-law were charged with financial frauds, involving nearly $1 billion in local currency, much of which is

(Continued on page 5)

(Continued from page 4)

believed widely in south Korea to have been siphoned into the treasury of the blue house as political funds.

Another major financial deceit broke, which is publicly known as the Myongsong group scandal. It has become clear that Chon's father-in-law is directly involved in the scandal.

The Chon family have been involved in many other financial scandals such as a land fraud, the bribery case over the imports of rice from the United States and briberies over "government" licensing.

Desperate efforts on the part of Chon to prove not guilty have not remove public suspicions. While trying to whitewash these scandals, the junta is strengthening the clampdown on the people. In part to displace public distrust and in part to improve his own image and consequently to have his rule get legitimacy, Gen. Chon planned a series of publicity stunts; steps to host the 70th General Assembly of the Interparliamentary Union, Asian Games and Olympic Games and foreign trips to take Chon to Southeast Asian countries.

The IPU meeting was rendered a lackluster and lame session by the boycott of more than 30 countries including socialist countries and non-aligned states, forcing Chon to lose face.

In a bid to recoup itself for the loss, the Chon junta adopted a new option designed to launch a massive anti-communist campaign: the so-called KAL incident and the Rangoon bomb explosion.

Whose Interests Are Best Served by Rangoon Bombing?

Immediately following the bomb blast at the Aung San Mausoleum, the offenders were identified by Chon Du Hwan as north Koreans, without any hard evidence and even before any on-the-spot investigation was carried out. The south Korean armed forces and police force were put on an emergency alert.

Despite the fact that many of his cabinet members in charge of foreign policy, economic planning and military strategy had been killed in the bombing, Chon in the end did not visit the scene of bombing nor did see the survivors of the bombing. He simply left Rangoon for home.

More than 100 alleged investigators were dispatched to Rangoon, while pressure was applied to bear upon the Burmese government to sever diplomatic relations with Pyongyang. This diplomatic move was supported by the American and Japanese governments which also tried to induce Rangoon to yield to the south Korean demand.

Finally subdued by the pressure from the Chon junta and its patrons the Americans and Japanese, the Burmese government, alleging the bombing was the work of the DPRK without citing any material evidence to substantiate the charge, took a totally unjustifiable step of severing diplomatic relations with Pyongyang on November 4 last.

The following questions remain yet to be answered in the alleged charges as produced by the south Koreans and Burmese:

(1) Why did the Burmese government decide to agree to Chon's visit at a time when he was condemned worldwide as a military fascist?

With no diplomatic profit anticipated, the only probable motive behind the Burmese decision is economic and financial consideration.

Burma is widely known as on the verge of financial bankruptcy.

(2) Why did Chon decide to postpone his planned visit to the mausoleum to the following day and why did he delay his departure from the guest house for the mausoleum?

This is quite a breach of diplomatic protocol. The original schedule called for Chon's direct trip to the mausoleum from the airport on arrival from Seoul. No explanation was given without any reason.

(3) Why were the two officials in charge of security retained – the director of the agency for national security planning and the chief of the "presidential protective force" – in the cabinent reshuffle made in the wake of the bombing?

Under normal circumstances, they had no reason at all to remain in their jobs. They should have been charged with negligence in the performance of their duties.

The most likely explanation is that the two and Chon together masterminded the bombing blast for the political purpose.

(4) If he had really thought that the incident was engineered by the north, an act considered tantamount to the declaration of war as he said, why did the trigger-happy Chon fail to commence military action in retaliation?

Was Chon so reasonable? A better answer is that he knew that it was he that carried out the bombing for the purpose of hoaxing the people into silence and put them in line and not for the purpose of an immediate initiation of war acts. This sort of climate must have been shaped in preparation for the coming to Seoul of Reagan.

(5) Very important, in the long run, whose interests, northern and southern, are best served by the Rangoon bombing and the ensuing fuss?

All the past so-called incidents have been unilaterally exploited to serve the interests of those in power in Seoul. It was Pyongyang that has stood always to lose most from those. The incidents have always come to serve to help Syngman Rhee, Pak Jung Hi and Chon Du Hwan. Is Pyongyang a friend in need for the south Korean dictators? The answer is categorically obvious.

Those incidents are familiar and all-purpose anti-communist bogeys produced whenever deemed necessary and in particular at a time when the south Korean dictator finds himself in hot water.

(6) Without any on-site investigation carried out and without an interview carried out with any witness, why did Chon decide to charge the north with masterminding the blast?

Did Pyongyang inform him? The Burmese authorities had not started any investigation yet. They had found no clue to the offenders.

There will be no end to the list of questions to be answered by the south Koreans and Burmese authorities?

The Burmese government began a trial of those alleged criminals and found them guilty on December 9. No details of the key parts of the incident or those of the criminals themselves were provided. Their alleged confessions were the sole pieces of evidence made available. No evidence, too, showing of their northern identification, was produced.

The contents and wording of the Burmese announcements are virtually identical with those of the south Korean versions, graphic proof of the authorship of the scenario.

As proved in history, the south Korean rulers resorted to their standard method of drumming up the alleged northern threat to bale themselves out of their crisis to maintain their dictatorial politics. By so doing they tried to derail the mounting public grievances.

The so-called August 15, 1974 assassination attempt on the Pak Jung Hi and the August 8, 1973 Kim Dae Jung kidnap incident were at first announced as the work of the north and an attempt was made to impute responsibility onto the north.

The Kwangju uprising was at first branded by the martial-law command of Gen. Chon as masterminded by the north.

A historical review points to an international conspiracy hatched by the Chon and company with the backing of its patrons, which accounts for the Rangoon bombing.

Without its own popular support and legitimacy, the junta of Gen. Chon cannot last a day without American or Japanese support. It is a puppet regime.

South Korea is a strategic important vantage point never to be lost to the democratic forces which favor reunification from the viewpoint of American and Japanese military planners.

American Policy toward Korea

South Korea carries vital importance to the multiple response strategy of the Reagan Administration. The importance of south Korea was underlined when Reagan visited south Korea and Japan in November last.

A partial reason for Reagan's visit to the Far East is his calculation that a presidential trip abroad means extensive mass media coverage, the cheapest and most effective publicity which may help win increased public favor in the upcoming presidential election.

A major reason for his decision to fly to Seoul is to give a shot in the arm of Gen. Chon Du Hwan floundering through a series of political, economic and social crises and to promote the military integration of the United States, Japan and south Korea by strengthening military support for the junta.

Emerging from his trip to south Korea, Reagan attached vital importance to the role of south Korea in American security policy considerations and pledged greater American military support. He also announced a plan to beef up the American military presence in south Korea in a big way.

There were some reports that Reagan while visiting south Korea paid attention to the issue of human rights and democracy, reports based on deliberately circulated leaks whose purpose it was to conceal the real American purpose and soften democratic criticism of his association with the local dictator.

With Reagan came the reaffirmation of the American opposition to any move toward the restoration of Koreanism throughout the Korean Peninsula. He voiced full support to the idea of "cross recognition" and perpetuating the division of Korea as "two Koreas."

This Korean policy of the Reagan administration sets the stage for "confrontation of strength" and "sharpening of tensions" on the Korean Peninsula.

A portentous move was taken by Reagan during his south Korean trip: He dressed up on the front line facing the north across the 38th Parallel and gave a pep talk to the GIs there. This reminds us of Dulles's front-line inspection on the eve of the Korean War.

The Far Eastern junket of Reagan was followed by the largest American-south Korean air force exercise which last from November 29 and December 1, reportedly involving more than 200 warplanes, among them dozens of F-15s based on Okinawa.

All these facts described in the above demonstrate the need to terminate American military and nuclear presence in south Korea and put an end to the American colonial domination of that part of Korea and thus to thaws tensions on the Korean Peninsula.

Nuclear-Free Zone in Northeast Asia

All available data leave little doubt that unlike the last Korean War which affected mostly the Korean people, a new war in Korea is global nuclear war far from limited to the Korean Peninsula as Reagan wishes and spilling into Japan and the United States. Nuclear war has no regard for the Americans or the rich.

In order to bring peace and security to the Korean Peninsula, it is essential to transform the Korean ceasefire agreement into a peace agreement and convert Northeast Asia into a nuclear-free, peace zone.

Democratization of south Korea and the independent and peaceful reunificaiton of Korea brook no further delay as a focal issue of immense implications for the peace and security of Asia and the rest of the world.

Given the predominant position of the United States vis-a-vis Japan and south Korea, it is far simpler and easier for American military decision-makers to unleash nuclear war in the Far East and in particular in Korea.

The islands of Japan is a de facto military complex serving the 7th fleet and Pacific forces of the United States as demonstrated by the presence of a huge nuclear strategic military base on Okinawa and by the frequent visits to Yokosuka and Sasebo of nuclear-powered or nuclear-equipped American warships.

In south Korea there are at least 1,000 American nuclear warheads in place for instant use against the DPRK. No disarmament talks exist on the Korean Peninsula.

In Europe there have been the on-and-off security talks between the two blocs, while none of the sort has been in Asia.

Nuclear shootout in Europe, in the eyes of American military planners, would result in quick demolition of European civilization, from which the U.S. was born, and in eventual expansion to the U.S. mainland.

The same military planners believe that nuclear war on the Korean Peninsula would be totally different. They see no nuclear capability in the north.

Because of its own isolation and instability, the junta of Gen. Chon and its American masters are highly subject to temptations to launch a first nuclear strike.

These temptations are far more inviting in Korea than in Europe.

This warrants an urgency of creating a Northeast Asian nuclear-free peace zone as soon as possible.

International Situation

With 1984 upon us, this year is a very eventful and turbulent year.

The Reagan administration ordered 2,000-strong U.S. combat troops into an island country of Grenada with a population of 110,000 on November 25. The tiny island was placed completely under American military occupation.

Reagan tried to defend this invasion as "a rescue operation to protect the safety of Americans resident on that island" and "to restore democratic order" in the island country. His rhetoric fails to whitewash the undisguised aggressive act against a sovereign state Grenada.

If this open aggression is permitted to go unpunished, it follows that there will be no way left for a small and weak country to protect its own security and sovereignty.

At present Reagan is publicly speaking of a possible military invasion of Nicaragua. There is a real danger of Reagan launching an armed attack on the Central American state.

Reagan is trigger-happy indeed, so is his policy of achieving the superiority of strength and attaching top priority to military buildup.

In December public attention has been focused on the situation in Lebanon; the Lebanese mess is nothing but a byproduct of the Reagan administration's policy of aggression and war as it reached strategic cooperation with the Zionists.

The behavior of Reagan is clearly an act of aggression.

He, styling himself as "gendarme of the world," is machinating to militarily intervene in many countries and subvert those governments unwilling to dance to his tune. His is a really anachronistic mentality.

One of the disquieting things in the international developments this year is an indefinite suspension of Russo-U.S. talks on intermediate-range nuclear forces and strategic arms limitation.

Few people predicted that the talks would be successful with Reagan deploying intermediate nuclear weapons in Europe. In this sense, it would not be surprising to see the deadlock and breakdown of the talks.

Since the appearance of Reagan, the Russo-U.S. relations have been cooling down, with the international relations further strained. In addition, the two sets of talks, one on INF and the other known as START (strategic arms reduction talks), broke down, producing far-reaching implications for the world situation.

A fear is that the arms race between the two will be accelerated.

This shows that there is no other alternative than the independent power of the people whereby to preserve the right of each nation to self-determination and the peace and security of the world. The people must reassert their power to decide their own destiny.

Therefore, much is to be expected of the dramatic upsurge of the anti-nuclear movement in Western European countries such as West Germany, the United Kingdom, Italy, and Holland.

Nuclear pacifism has not necessarily been in style in those countries. The installation of Reagan as U.S. leader prompted an unprecedented surge of the anti-nuclear movement. Thus the American leader can be called a fast breeder of nuclear pacifism.

Based on the policy of strength, Reagan decided to build up nuclear power to win nuclear war. He hinted that his administration was contemplating limited nuclear warfare in Asia and Europe and stressed a likelihood of the U.S. making a nuclear first strike.

The deployment of intermediate-range nuclear weapons to Western Europe has encountered a strong resistance from its people of various nationalities. None could afford to sit on one's hands while in a country and one's town were being converted into a theatre of nuclear war spelling the destruction of mankind.

The anti-nuclear peace movement in Western Europe is playing an increasingly great role together with the non-aligned movement. This year's world developments add to the role of the anti-nuclear campaign.

With the presidential election one year away, the Reagan administration is adopting a hard-line stance toward the Soviet Union and at the same time a confrontationist policy of aggravating world tensions.

There is no ruling out the prospect of such American policy causing disputes to explode in different places of the world next year, leading to the outbreak of a new world war.

This threat is present in Europe, the Middle East, Latin America, Southern Africa and the Korean Peninsula.

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In June last I went to Czechoslovakia to attend a world rally against nuclear war and for life held in Prague. The impression I got there is that an overwhelming majority of the people the world over feel threatened by nuclear war. The participants strongly stressed that it was time for mankind to rise to ban and destroy all the nuclear weapons.

The peoples of the world live in different countries of different continents. They all have common interests to be best served by opposing imperialist war and aggression, prohibiting completely nuclear weapons and achieving total disarmament.

Next year, too, the Korean people will fight on to have nuclear weapons and U.S. forces withdrawn from south Korea and accomplish the independent peaceful reunification of their homeland.

(第三種郵便物認可)

Review of Korean Nationals in Japan In 1983

The 13th Congress was a highlight of the 1983 Chongryun work.

At its 13th Congress (June 27–29), Chongryun officially made public its continuous allegiance to President Kim Il Sung and Mr. Kim Jong Il and firmly committed itself to make an effort for the independent peaceful reunification of the homeland.

After the 13th Congress the documentary film on "Mr. Kim Jong Il's China Visit" was widely shown among Koreans and Japanese.

The 13th Congress summed up the achievements in Chongryun work attained in the past three years since the 12th Congress held in November 1980.

The 12th Congress advanced the following: to further model the Chongryun organization on the Juche idea; to develop democratic national education and defend the democratic national rights of Korean residents in Japan; to promote the movement for the earlier reunification of the homeland; to strengthen international solidarity with Japanese and other peoples the world over; and thus to consolidate the Chongryun organization.

In the course of carrying out these tasks there was fully displayed the allegiance of Korean nationals to the DPRK led by the President and the young leader. In particular the enthusiasm of the Korean nationals was noticeable in the celebrations of the 70th birthday of President Kim Il Sung and the June 25–July 27 No More Koroshima Peace March held last year.

Korean nationals financed a total of 23 industrial factories build in the DPRK celebrating the President's 70th birthday. A large number of sets of important equipment were sent to the homeland for the development of its national economy. Some 5 million yen were donated to the homeland by the Korean community here for the development of its national economy. Over 213,000 joined demonstration and the cheer teams in the peace march.

Based on these achievements this year Chongryun organized a "120-day campaign" to meet the 13th Congress from Feb. 16 to June 15.

The primary task of this "120-day campaign" was to consolidate the Chongryun organization on a basis of the firm commitment to the President – and the young leader – led DPRK. This campaign also set forth the following tasks: to strengthen the unity of Chongryun and Korean nationals and make Chongryun organizations deeply root in broad strata of the Koreans by heightening functions and roles of chapters and branches; to develop education and take on a large number of Korean children to Korean schools; to defend democratic national rights; guarantee successful performances of the Pyongyang Students and Children's Art Troupe; U.S. troops withdrawal from south Korea; and strengthen the solidarity between Koreans and Japanese.

To carry out these tasks, various campaigns were organized and proceeded by each organization. Thus in the beginning of June almost all the tasks set forth in the "120-day campaign" were achieved before the 13th Chongryun Congress.

A large number of Chongryun activists joined in each branch work. Education of the 2nd and 3rd generation was underlined. Adult classes and youth classes are managed regularly by each Chongryun organization through th.. "campaign to manage 1,000 youth classes," where things Korean are taught to the 2nd and 3rd generation Koreans to have a strong sense of the national identity. This campaign was proposed at the 12th Congress and in 1982 the number of the youth classes leapfrogged to some 1,100 and during the "120-day campaign" its number increased twice compared with that of the beginning. Various kinds of classes for education of the 2nd and 3rd generation include adult classes, youth classes, mother classes and culture classes. Each Chongryun headquarter and chapter organized councils to promote youth class work and sent many graduates from Korean schools to these classes as teachers. Through these activities the 2nd and 3rd generation Koreans participated in activities of branches, the smallest unit of Chongryun organizations. Regular study gathering and branch work began to be guaranteed.

Now some 1,200 branches perform their functions in close contact with Korean compatriots throughout Japan.

Through energetic efforts of Chongryun and Korean nationals, Chongryun organizations are strengthened. Members of women, youth and other organizations rose.

During the "120-day campaign", a signatory-collecting campaign was held from Feb. 16–to Apr. 30 in protest against the "Team Spirit '83", the U.S.-south Korea joint military drill aiming at a new war provocation, demanding immediate withdrawal of U.S. troops and nuclear weapons from south Korea and opposing nuclear warfare.

The signatory-collecting campaign stirred up public sentiments. The "Team Spirit '83" was based on a three-way military alliance aimed at the DPRK. There were also gathering and demonstrations.

On the other hand, the Pyongyang Students and Children's Art Troupe made a successful Japan tour. During its 67-day stay in Japan from Apr. 3–June 13, the troupe staged 57 performances in 25 major cities from Hokkaido, the northern most, to the southernmost island of Kyushu. Some 150,000 Japanese and Koreans enjoyed its performances, which won their unreserved applause.

These parents who were worried about the education of their children at Japanese school were prompted to send their children to Korean schools.

In the Korean educational work progress was made. Now Chongryun operates one university, 85 elementary, 56 middle and 12 high schools and 66 kindergartens with a combined enrolment of 44,000.

Contents of textbooks are improved aiming to educate Korean children with national pride and identity and extensive knowledge required to live in this country – for instance Japanese language classes increased.

Chongryun made its efforts to defend the democratic national rights of Koreans here. The result is that many Koreans were entitled to "permission of special permanent residence," "application of social benefit" and a "partial amendment of the Alien Registration Law."

Chongryun has actively worked with local governments which adopted petitions to the Japanese government, calling for the fundamental amendment of the "Alien Registration Law," which aims to regulate Korean nationals, by obliging them to carry alien registration certificate with themselves for 24 hours, be fingerprinted, and a violation of which is punishable under the law.

Thus as of the beginning of December some 300 local government assemblies including five prefectural assemblies adopted resolutions demanding the fundamental amendment of the "Alien Registration Law."

Chongryun has stirred better the life and business activities of Korean nationals. The management of the Korean credit associations, trade unions and the Kumgang Insurance Company was further improved.

Now Chongryun has 166 head offices and branches of Korean credit associations (38 head offices) with a total amount of over 851.1 billion yen deposits, 15.1 percent increase compared with last year. (As of the end of November).

All these achievements were attributed to the DPRK's political and moral help in and deep solicitude to the Korean nationals.

This year, too, President Kim Il Sung sent the New Year message to the Korean compatriots. In the message he indicated the road the Korean compatriots had to follow. Educational aid fund and stipends were sent for four times to the Korean children and students here. The total amount of educational aid fund and stipends reached 34,649,427,033 yen in Japanese currency as of December, which have been remitted for 89 times since 1957.

Many Korean teachers were named "People's Teacher," or "Merited Teacher," highly-valued honorary titles of the DPRK. On the other hand, Korean patriotic traders were awarded "Order of Socialist Patriotism". They were Kim Jae Sok, vice-Chairman of the Chiba Prefectural Trade Union and Kim Bak Sa, the chief director of the trade union of Nakasugi chapter of the Korean Trade Union.

A large number of Koreans were invited to the homeland, including the congratulatory groups celebrating the 71st birthday of the President and the 35th birthday of the DPRK.

They were: Some 970 Korean nationals as members of various delegations, 2,171 as short-term visiting group members, 100 as one-month visiting group members, 402 students of graduate course of Choson University, 551 high school students and others as of the end of November.

Greater participation of young Koreans in Japanese society increased this year. This was represented by Kim Kye Dok, the going and upcoming professional boxer, and An Song U, a magician.

Kim Kye Dok, 26 years old third-generation Korean, won the Japanese Middleweight Championships on Jan. 25 last, three and half years after he started to train himself as a boxer.

He uses "Chollima" for his name as a professional boxer. Chollima is legendary horse of Korea which is believed to have run one thousand ri a day. Chollima is a symbol of socialist construction and the DPRK. One who visits Korea, can see the Chollima Statue in downtown of Pyongyang.

Socialist Korea is his hope and like the bosom of his mother. He wanted to fight matches as an overseas Korean youth of socialist homeland. Sewn on his truck, shoes and gown which he wears in matches are the letters reading Chollima, pictures of the legendary horse and a Korean map on his gown, which impresses on the boxing fans his strong desire for the reunification of Korea.

He succeeded in defending his Japanese middleweight championship in grueling bouts held on May 24 and Dec. 16. Last summer he visited the U.S. and trained himself, where American coaches tipped him to be a strong candidate for a world title. He was Dec. 4 introduced in a Japanese TV program as a hopeful boxer.

An Song U, a 24-year old Korean youth, won the gold prize at the "55th I.B.M. International Magic Contest" held in early July in Honolulu, Hawaii, a highly authoritative competition. He is the first Korean magician to participate in this contest and win the gold prize. He said he wanted to show in his magic stunts Korea and Korean people's desire. His wife put on colorful traditional costume and assisted his magic. On umbrellas he used in his magic were letters reading "Korea Is One."

Both of them received education in Korean schools from elementary schools. Kim Kye Dok attended schools in Kobe and An Song U in Osaka. Kim Kye Dok, while helping his father's work and training himself as a boxer, worked among Korean youths as a part-time vice-Chairman of the Higashi Kobe branch of the Kobe headquarters of the Korean Youth League in Japan.

Both of them are popular among Korean nationals in this country.

(Continued from page 8)

adroitly surmounted these crises each time, periodically replacing prime, finance, interior and other ministers. He knew that such cosmetics would not fundamentally alleviate the depth of public wrath against the "government".

. . . . . There seems little likelyhood of significant liberalization in future.

To be sure, these are essential opposition demands to make south Korea's parliamentary system a little more decent and workable.

Under the present assembly law, for instance, only the budget settlement committee can review the "government's"budget bill; no assembly member can speak beyond 30 minutes unless authorized by the speaker who, when criticism of the "president" or "government" is voiced, sometimes has the microphone cut off.

Repeated "government" denials and Chun's own oft-stated pledge not to extend his current term he will stay on. Failure to back his promise win an institutional framework to prepare for a peaceful change of government is at the root of dogged opposition suspicious of another constitutional rewrite. – *Far Eastern Economic Review, June 2, 1983* –

Photo shows participants in the 13th Chongryun Congress, which was held in the Tokyo Korean Cultural Hall from June 27 to 29.



Chollima Kye Dok, a third generation Korean professional boxer in Japan, on Jan. 25 won Japan's Middle-weight Championships.

Outrage upon Korean Girl Students

For the first time, Japanese right-wing hooligans attacked and injured two Korean high-school girls clad in traditional costume.

In the previous assaults male students alone were victims of such rightist jingoist racial violence.

The racially and politically inspired violence followed a phone call to a Korean school that there would soon be a rain of blood.

At about a.m. 7:50, on Nov. 24, near by the north gate of Kawasaki Station of the Japanese National Railway, a Japanese man fell on a Korean high-school girl (17 year-old) on her way to school who a third-year student of high school of Kanagawa Junior and Senior High School. The man battered her on the back of her head with a wooden staff and made her swoon. The assailant followed her about 40 metres and mugged her, shouting "You, Koreans, go home!"

The Korean girl sustained an injury which will take ten days to heal completely.

On the other hand, at about p.m. 5:40, on Dec. 6, another Korean third-year high school girl, 17, on her way home was attacked by a Japanese man on Higashitera Station in Tsurumi ward, Yokohama city.

The Japanese attacker pierced her thigh with a sharp knife.

She was given medical treatment at hospital promptly for excessive bleeding. The injury was five centimetres deep and two centimetres wide. Fortunately, her bones and the arteries, remained unscathed however.

Especially, on the evening of Nov. 28, there was even a threatening call to the Korean school from an unidentified man, to the effect that "You would see a rain of blood in the next week."

Since the Rangoon bombing blast has been reported one-sidedly, an anti-DPRK, anti-Chongryun campaigns has been launched by the south Korean and Japanese authorities. Against this background subversive activities against Chongryun organization have occurred in succession in many places of Japan.

On the afternoon of Nov. 18, two men stormed the head office of the General Association of Korean Residents in Japan (Chongryun) in Tokyo and fired pistols at a Chongryun official at the gate and then fired some 10 shots at the head office.

After the liberation of Korea, there were many raids on Koreans in Japan by the Japanese reactionaries. So far, however, there have been no such shameless racial violence on unresisting Korean girl student. In the last Kanto earthquake more than 5,000 Koreans were massacred by Japanese.

(Continued from page 3)

The DPRK Foreign Ministry already declared in its statement dated November 5:

"It is not without reason that the traitor Chon Du Hwan faked up this burlesque.

"Now the anti-U.S. struggle for independence and anti-fascist struggle for democracy of the patriotic people and students is daily gaining momentum in south Korea and the traitor Chon Du Hwan, a filthy dual stooge of the United States and Japan, is being driven into a serious fix within and without.

"To extricate himself out of the blind alley, it was necessary for the traitor Chon Du Hwan to produce a shocking drama."

No sooner had the bomb exploded than the triator Chon Du Hwan, kicking up a frenzied anti-communist, anti-DPRK racket groundlessly, issued an "emergency alert order" throughout south Korea and placed it on a full combat alert, intensified fascist suppression of the south Korean people as never before and pushed the situation on the Korean Peninsula to the brink of war.

A Japanese magazine said in this connection:

"Why did the south Korean regime hastily conclude that it was a 'work of north Korea' in the stage where a decisive evidence or ground had not yet been clarified? This caused the people at home and abroad to suspect it to be an internal offspring of south Korea, saying, 'Why they insist on its being a work of the north when there is no evidence?" (Japanese magazine "Mr. Dandy").

The traitor Chon Du Hwan stage-managed the Rangoon explosion also to present a high-priced "present" to Reagan in his south Korean tour.

3. "Political Settlement"

Although the truth of the Rangoon bomb blast was thus clear, the Burmese authorities took a rash and unilateral step of hurriedly declaring the severance of diplomatic relations with our country, without any legal and material evidence, before a probe was made into the concrete background of the incident. This time again they staged a burlesque of "trial" of the "suspects" and made an unnecessary fuss which cannot be regarded as normal by anyone.

The point is why they did so.

When the Rangoon bomb blast occurred, broad public of the world threw many doubts on the possibility of its being a work of our Republic, saying that it might be a drama of the traitor Chon Du Hwan's own making, it might be done by south Korean dissidents and that it might be carried out by a Burmese dissident force.

When the Burmese authorities announced that they arrested two "Koreans" regarded as "suspects" on October 10 and 12, the world public paid deep attention to it.

On October 25, one "suspect" said he "came from Seoul, south Korea". This completely upset the intrigues of the south Korean puppets to announce that the "suspects" came from the north.

Thrown into an utter confusion, the south Korean puppets got more feverish and put pressure upon the Burmese authorities to impute the blame for the Rangoon bomb blast to our Republic and, at the same time, openly begged the U.S. imperialist and Japanese masters to increase pressure upon them.

A Japanese commentator said in this regard:

"The announcement of the Burmese Government came on November 4 and, earlier, on November 3, 'Tonga Ilbo' carried a Rangoon report of Yonhap Tongsin, the only news agency of south Korea.

"I read this article, thinking that it may be a key to the incident.

"This article reads in part: "1, the Burmese Government is not in possession of a definite datum to draw a conclusive conclusion;

"2, but the case cannot be dragged on for an indefinite period.

"It is said that if Burma refused to sever diplomatic relations with the north, south Korea would put pressure upon her, threatening that it would break off relations with her. So Burma was forced to choose one of the two.

"In other words, the announcement of the Burmese Government is a product of a political settlement destitute of materials."

Asking why Burma came to this political settlement, the article continues to say:

"Burma which is troubled with the economic problem chose south Korea backed by the United States and Japan after comparing the north and the south.

"Burma is tilting its neutral policy to the West with her economy plunged into the worst situation of international payments from 1975." (Japanese "Tokyo Times," November 25, 1983).

The U.S. paper "Washington Post" in an article titled "Seoul Puts Pressure upon Rangoon" after the Rangoon explosion, said that "The impatient south Korean officials in Burma continue to force their assertion against north Korea in an attempt to put pressure upon the Burmese Government"., (U.S. "Washington Post," October 16, 1983).

On the very day of Rangoon explosion Reagan stated that the "United States would do everything possible, contending that "There is an ample opportunity of the north being involved in the explosion in Burma". Japanese Prime Minister Nakasone blared that he would render any cooperation necessary to south Korea," saying "this incident was plotted or instigated by the north" (south Korean "Radio No. 1", October 10, 1983).

When Burma took the unwarrantable step of breaking off diplomatic relations with our Republic, the Japanese Government promised her food and free loans in the form of emergency economic aid, in addition to a loan of 187 million dollars. (Japanese radio NHK, November 1, 1983).

A south Korean radio reported as regards this:

"The Japanese Government decided to give an emergency economic aid to the Burmese Government. The economic aid of Japan to Burma is known to be food and free loans.

"This plan of the Japanese Government is construed as one aimed to help Burma in her difficult economy, caused, for example, by the suspension of the construction of a cement factory in Burma assisted by north Korea, and to bring Japan closer to Burma from the diplomatic point of view.

"Japan's loans to Burma so far are known to be about 1,000 million dollars." (south Korean "Radio No. 1" November 6, 1983).

On December 6 the Japanese Government, to begin with, exchanged notes on granting "free loans" amounting to 3,354 million yen (14.34 million dollars) to Burma with the Burmese Government in Rangoon. (Japanese Jiji Press, Tokyo December 6, 1983).

The Burmese authorities, to make a long story short, fabricated in accordance with the prearranged script the preposterous "results of investigation" claiming that the Rangoon explosion was "a work of north Korea" through their "political settlement" with the United States, Japan and the south Korean puppets and staged the fraudulent "trial" farce to "justify" them.

But truth cannot be concealed.

As time flows, the dark intention of the organizers of the Rangoon explosion will be dragged into the light of day.

Even the materials of the "trial" made public by the Burmese authorities, independent of their subjective desire, proved more clearly to the whole world that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is innocent and upright.

On the contrary, the Burmese authorities besmirched their faces by their own hands by dancing to the drum-beating of the south Korean puppet clique, the dual stooge of the U.S. imperialists and the Japanese reactionaries, and they will suffer from its evil consequences for long.

Japanese Crew Detained For Spying in DPRK Seas and Ports

PYONGYANG, December 17 (KCNA) — The Korean Central News Agency published the following report on December 16:

The competent organ of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is investigating the apprehended Japanese ship "Fujisan-maru No. 18" belonging to the Japan Fuji Steamship Company, Ltd., which encroached upon the sovereignty of our country and violated its law and order.

While entering the Nampo Port on November 15, 1983, the "Fujisan-maru No. 18" violated the law and order of our country by deflecting from the designated sea route.

It was not the first time that the ship violated the law and order of our country. It had committed such violations many a time in the past.

But, each time, the competent organ of our country treated it leniently, taking note of the firm promise of its master not to commit such criminal act again and the friendly relations between the Korean and Japanese peoples.

Nevertheless, "Fujisan-maru No. 18" again violated the law and order of our country, abusing such lenient step of our side.

The competent organ could not but carry out a fact-finding investigation into the habitual violations committed by the ship.

In the course of the investigation, we found out that the continued violations of law and order in the waters of our country so far by the ship were directly connected with hostile espionage against our country.

According to statements of the master and chief engineer of the ship, they had committed insidious acts alien to the business of a trading ship, while sailing to and from our country many times.

They stated that they had systematically carried out espionage in our waters and ports and supplied the materials they had collected to their master.

They confessed that they had illegally carried our citizen to Japan and this criminal act also was committed under the behind-the-stage manipulation of the Japanese authorities.

The master of the ship found our citizen who was glued to a side of his ship at dawn on October 30, 1983, when it was with the chief engineer, lifted him on board the ship, stripped him of his wet clothes and made him put on the chief engineer's working clothes and hid him in the tools storage by the engine room.

When the ship was leaving Nampo Port next day, the master and chief engineer deceived the control organ by piling up various materials in front of the hiding place, so that our citizen might not be found out in the border control.

The master and chief engineer kept this a secret from their crewmen till the ship reached the Tsushima straits. They showed our citizen to the crewmen, pretending to have found him only then, and informed the Japanese authorities of this through wireless communication and handed him over to them at Moji Port.

Saying that their crimes had been planned and committed on the instructions of the Japanese authorities, the master and chief engineer of "Fujisan-maru No. 18" stated that they received a large amount of money in reward for their criminal acts when leaving for our country and they were to receive another large sum of money back home.

Such acts of theirs are crimes crudely violating the law and order of our country and international law.

According to press reports, the south Korean puppets are scheming to interfere in this incident.

We can never connive at this fact.

If the Japanese authorities conspire with the south Korean puppets in this incident, they will entail grave consequences and will be held entirely responsible for this.

The investigation into "Fujisan-maru No. 18" continues.

Rodong Sinmun Raps Seoul's Claim on "Spy Boat Case"

The "incident of intrusion of armed personnel" again faked up by the south Korean junta on Dec. 4 is a premeditated drama in which they pursue the vicious aim of killing two birds with one stone: To "replenish" the incident of Rangoon explosion, intensify their anti-communist, anti-DPRK campaign for slinging mud at the DPRK and bridge over the crisis of their rule, declared Rodong Sinmun (organ of the CC of the WPK) on Dec. 11.

Commenting on the announcement of the Chon Du Hwan junta on Dec. 4 that they sank a "boat" of the north on the coastal sea of Tadaepo, Pusan, capturing two armed men alive and equipment, the paper said:

The "incident," like the Rangoon explosion, was cooked up by the junta themselves, driven by political necessity.

The author of the commentary went on:

The puppets are foolishly attempting to shift on to us the responsibility for the Rangoon explosion, a drama of their own making, and the explosion at the "American Cultural Centre" in Taegu carried out by the south Korean people, linking them with the above faked-up case.

To provoke us by fabricating what they call "cases of infiltration" is an old game employed by the south Korean puppets to slander us. There is nothing new in the "incident" in question.

The puppets themselves announced that the "persons" who infiltrated into the sea were in a critical condition. But they concluded that they were our "armed personnel" without so much as questioning the suspects.

The "political parties," as if they had been waiting for this, published commentaries branding it as "an act of the north," the puppet foreign ministry issued urgent "instructions" to diplomatic and consular offices abroad to have international "joint sanctions" taken and brought it even to the United Nations.

This noisy din is not an accidental "concerted action," but indicates that the "incident" was a tricky drama staged by the puppets premeditatedly on the instructions of the U.S. imperialist master.

With no amount of attempt can the puppets conceal the truth of the drama of their own making or mislead public opinion.

The anti-communist drama cannot be a fig leaf for the treacheries of the puppets or a means of prolonging their remaining days, but will only further reveal their ugly color and hasten their own destruction.

The puppets must promptly stop their anti-communist smear campaign based on fictitious "case of intrusion."

People Have Not Forgotten Kwangju, Chon's Legitimacy Questioned: Western Media

Western media said that Chon Du Hwan who came to power by force is not winning support from the people. They argued that south Koreans question Chon junta's political legitimacy and that the people have not forgotten and forgiven him for what he did in Kwangju in May 1980.

They also said a series of financial scandals which touched Chon's family and officials in his "government" have done more to discredit Gen. Chon who had talked about "a clean government" and "a just society."

Here are excerpts from articles which appeared in various Western publications this year describing Chon as an unpopular, authoritarian and unqualified "leader":

Mechanisms of Repression Still in Place

I recently visited south Korea on a week-long fact-finding mission on behalf of the International Human Rights Law Group and the International League for Human Rights. The trip confirmed that the mechanisms of repression that were established by "President" Chun Doo Hwan in 1980 and 1981 are still in place:

Approximately 300 politicians remain banned from engaging in political activity; the estimates of political prisoners (mostly students) range from 400 to more than 1,000; trade unions have been all but abolished; and "self-censorship" of the press continues to prevent meaningful public political debate.

The memories of Mr. Chun's violent rise to power – and the 1980 Kwangju killings by the South Korean Army, in which hundreds of demonstrators died – are not forgotten. The very legitimacy of the Chun "government" is now being questioned by many south Koreans.

Yet few people with whom I spoke in Seoul expressed optimism about the prospects for a peaceful transition to democracy. *– The Los Angeles Times, Nov. 14, 1983 –*

Authoritarian Rule in S. Korea Will Lead to Turmoil

The danger on the Korean Peninsula is less a surprise attack from the North than that authoritarian rule in the South will lead to turmoil. . . .

The "Republic of Korea" remains an authoritarian state with a facade of democracy. . . . "President" Chun's seizure of power by force, the army's brutal suppression of popular demonstrations in Kwangju in 1980 and financial scandals involving his family have made it difficult for the "Government" to establish legitimacy. *– The New York Times, Oct. 6, 1983 –*

Chon's Popularity Almost at Zero Level

Since rising to power in a hail of bullets, South Korean President Chun Doo Hwan has tried to win the hearts of his doubting countrymen.

Still, four years after he began his rise to power, Mr. Chun still hasn't achieved the respect and popularity he seeks among his people, according to a variety of Koreans and Western diplomats who follow politics here.

Presidential popularity polls aren't allowed in Korea, but interviews with scores of Koreans and foreigners over several months suggest that many people here– particularly those in elite business, academic and journalistic circles – don't hold Mr. Chun in high regard.

"Especially among intellectuals, his popularity is almost at the zero level," says a U.S.-educated small businessman. A taxi driver puts it this way: Half the people intensely dislike him. Mr. Chun may feel he's too unpopular to loosen the tight reins he's maintained on the political scene, which could only worsen his popularity problem. Without a freer political system, it will be hard for Mr. Chun to do anything more than handpick a successor, likely a former military man.

Many Koreans doubt that he'll even take that step. They worry that a leader as unpopular as Mr. Chun would place himself in personal danger by relieving himself of power. Such concern, these people say, might prompt Mr. Chun to extend his rule, as his predecessors did.

The president's popularity has suffered for a variety of reasons. For one thing, many Koreans question his political legitimacy because he took office by force. Many haven't forgiven him for what they see as excesses during his rise to power, especially the bloody suppression of a May 1980 insurrection in the southern city of Kwangju.

Critics also say the president's slogans – which promise a "new era" and "just society" – have become increasingly hollow in light of several financial scandals. The scandals have had links to the family of the president's wife. Many here say members of the first lady's family are more interested in enriching themselves than in helping to deliver good government.

Mr. Chun launched his move to the top just six weeks after Mr. Park was killed by the head of his own intelligence agency. Mr. Chun at that time was a two-star general. On Dec. 12, 1979, he moved troops through Seoul and took over the army, arresting several top generals after a series of shootouts. In May 1980 he staged a second "coup" and seized power from a civilian government that had been installed after Mr. Park's death. The Kwangju rebellion – which Mr. Chun violently suppressed – broke out a day after the second coup. *– The Asian Wall Street Journal, Dec. 16-17, 1983 –*

202 Student Protests In 11 Months

It's shortly before noon on an autumn day and things are turning nasty at Yonsei University. Students opposed to the "Government" are engaged in a mock fight with plainclothes policemen stationed on campus.

The students shout slogans like "Down with the Chun dictatorship," in protest of the administration of "President" Chun Doo Hwan. The plainclothes men wear white, knit gloves over black ones to cushion their knuckles when punching students.

Backing up the plainclothes men are riot police dressed in green fatigues, combat boots and black helmets that look like samurai head gear. They fire tear gas canisters, but don't otherwise engage the protesters.

The rally, which lasted three hours, was the "longest and toughest" demonstration at Yonsei since Mr. Chun took power in May 1980, says Horace G. Underwood, a member of the school's board of directors and assistant to the president.

"Yankee go home," once a slogan unknown to Korean students, is becoming part of their lexicon.

. . . . . By most measures protest seems to be growing. A human rights organization here reports dramatic increases this year in student protests and in prosecutions of students. (The group doesn't want to be identified for fear of "government" reprisal.)

The organization says there were 202 student protests in the first 11 months of this year, compared with 104 for all of 1982. These figures comprise mainly demonstrations, although leafleting incidents also are included. The group also said 321 students were prosecuted in the 11 months, compared with 183 in 1982. Western diplomats say they regard these figures as reliable.

Student slogans vary from campus to campus but many center on demands for an end to the "military dictatorship" of Mr. Chun, an end to U.S. support for the "government" and an end to the police presence on campus. But underlying the slogans is a feeling among some students that Korea is becoming overly dependent on the U.S. and Japan. Some blame this dependency for the country's precarious levels of debt.

Students, professors, university administrators and human rights activists offer a variety of reasons why young demonstrators are becoming more radical.

– Students have lost faith in prospects for democratic change and don't believe Mr. Chun will keep his oft-stated promise to step down when his presidential term expires in 1988. Furthermore, they regard Mr. Chun as a usurper who dashed hopes for democratic change when he seized power after "President" Park Chung Hee's assassination in 1979. Students also have lost faith in the U.S., which they once considered an ally for people seeking more representative government. "We know we can't count on the government," one student said. "But we continue to demonstrate because it's the only way to show our attitude about the government."

– Students have become less respectful of authority as social values change. As one Western diplomat explains, students 20 years ago would pick up a piece of paper from the floor if a professor so requested. "Students just don't do that anymore." he says. "This has obvious implications about the way students feel about their government."

– The "Government" has aggravated the situation with its heavy handed campus presence. At times under "President" Park, students were allowed to demonstrate on campus, though they were prevented from marching onto the streets.

– The Asian Wall Street Journal, Dec. 8, 1983 –

Growing Frustration Among S. Korean People

"President" Chun Doo Hwan, a former general who took control in March 1981 after the military revised the Constitution to its liking in October 1980, has pledged to move toward a free, democratic multiparty system.

"But the Chun regime is not building or laying the ground-work for democratic institutions," a senior Western diplomat here said. "In fact, the direction so far is somewhat the other way. And there is growing frustration within the populace, which wants greater freedoms."

Under the current Government freedom of the press is several limited and many reporters have been banned. Newspapers that owned television stations had to sell them to the Government, which now controls televised newscasts.

Students do not have the right to demonstrate on campus. Political activity has been curtailed, since participation in an "unauthorized assembly or demonstration" can result in a jail term of up to seven years. In addition, labor unions are under tighter control.

There are growing pressures on the Chun "Government" to liberalize political life in south Korea, some external and others internal.

Many here are skeptical about Mr. Chun's willingness to step aside voluntarily when the moment arrives. Others point out that he could leave office only to fill it with a hand-picked successor, a move falling for short of the original pledge and bringing no real change of power.

After a period of calm, political activity and anti-Government demonstrations on university campuses increased considerably last fall and again in this year's spring semester, according to foreign diplomats.

"At first, the students waited to see what Chun would do," a diplomat said. "Now many of them feel that their suspicions have been confirmed."

As of last November, more than 400 university students were in prison on political charges, according to the human rights committee of the National Council of Churches in Korea. *– The New York Times, Aug. 2, 1983 –*

Kim Yong Sam's Hunger Strike Political Victory

Opposition leader Kim Young Sam's 23-day hungerstrike failed in its aim of extracting immediate political reforms from "president" Chun Doo Hwan, but it did shake Chun's three-year-old regime out of a sense of complacency. And the fact, which Kim began on May 18 and ended on June 9 has brought into action again various opposition movements which had been dormant since they were first suppressed under martial law in May 1980. If the reassertion of these movements is allowed to continue, the Chun administration could soon face the level of political dissent that once troubled the "government" of the late "president" Park Chung Hee in the 1970s.

South Korea's real opposition movement has always been led by underground dissidents including church figures, student activists and such key figures as Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung, who is now living in exile in the United States.

The two Kims campaigned vigorously for democratic reforms under the previous Park, "government." If Kim Dae Jung, through his kidnapping by south Korean agents from Tokyo in 1973 and his subsequent political persecution, had symbolised unyielding dissent against authoritarian rule, Kim Young Sam helped bring down the Park regime in 1979 through his anti-"government" efforts in and out of the "national assembly". Politically the two men are bitter rivals, but they have now joined hands in a common front against Chun. They describe Chun's imposition of martial law in May 1980 as a "coup d'etat."

All indications are that Kim Young Sam has won a considerable political victory. He has united the country's diverse dissident movements behind him by strengthening his links with the Christian churches, the campuses and with other intellectual critics of "government." He also has won enough overseas support to stay the harsh hand of "government" reprisal as the administration considers what response to make to the regrouped opposition.

Kim is not likely to compromise his campaign to force Chun to revise the constitution. Elaborating on this point, one of Kim's aides said: "Under the present constitution, it is quite possible that Chun can be followed [in office] by another retired general [elected through the collegium]. If this is allowed to continue south Korea, with generals from the various services of the armed forces taking turns in assuming the presidency, will go the way of Central and Latin America [in their] style of politics. What we want is a constitution which will preclude such tragic setbacks for democracy."

What Kim wants is a system which will assure a smooth transition of power from military to civilian hands in 1988, when Chun's term ends. He wants all politicians, including himself and Kim Dae Jung, to compete in an election for the "presidency.". In this regard, Chun's recent promise to step down in 1988 is not likely to pacify the opposition because he also refuses to rewrite the constitution to ensure free elections.

Chun is facing the dilemma or whether to accede to the hardliners and thereby risk producing another martyr like Kim Dae Jung, or drift as he has recently done and risk facing a growing attack on his leadership. Both choices are unpalatable. The only alternative in the present situation may be for Chun to strengthen the power of the "national assembly", allowing the authorized opposition to gain some political ground and credibility. *– Far Eastern Economic Review, June 23, 1983 –*

Little Likelihood Of Liberalization

But what casual viewers overlook is the substance of south Korean-style democracy that has functioned here for 11 years. In addition of the head of state, there is a parliament whose power and authority is severely limited compared with parliaments in other countries: a far cry from parliament before 1972, when the assasinated "president" Park Chung Hee rewrote the constitution. The choice before Chun – as many opposition critics see it – is whether to liberalise his system and give more authority to parliament or to continue, more or less, the process of piecemeal concessions seen over the past three years. It seems that, regardless of what his policymakers say, full political liberalisation will be painstakingly slow.

One diplomat here (in Seoul) describes the situation – a remark not far off the mark:

A series of massive financial and political scandals rocked the "government" last year, tarnishing Chun's image as a reformer. He

(Continued on page 6)

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